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Abstract This paper offers an ethical framework for the
development of robots as home companions that are inten-
ded to address the isolation and reduced physical functioning
of frail older people with capacity, especially those living
alone in a noninstitutional setting. Our ethical framework
gives autonomy priority in a list of purposes served by as-
sistive technology in general, and carebots in particular. It
first introduces the notion of ‘‘presence’’ and draws a dis-
tinction between humanoid multi-function robots and non-
humanoid robots to suggest that the former provide a more
sophisticated presence than the latter. It then looks at the
difference between lower-tech assistive technological sup-
port for older people and its benefits, and contrasts these with
what robots can offer. This provides some context for the
ethical assessment of robotic assistive technology. We then
consider what might need to be added to presence to produce
care from a companion robot that deals with older people’s
reduced functioning and isolation. Finally, we outline and
explain our ethical framework. We discuss how it combines
sometimes conflicting values that the design of a carebot
might incorporate, if informed by an analysis of the different
roles that can be served by a companion robot.
Keywords Robots  Ethics  Telecare  Assistive
technology  Autonomy  Nature of care  ACCOMPANY
What role might robots have in the future care at home of
older people? That depends on the kind of robot and the
aspects of ageing addressed. We argue that social robots—
represented in our discussion by the Care-O-bot—com-
mendably integrate the functions of useful non-robotic
telecare devices, and that they also have a claim to the
potentially therapeutic property we call ‘‘presence’’. The
relevant normative requirements that we discuss are mostly
ethical, though they might also include value for money,
and considerations about the range of physical environ-
ments in which the relevant technology can operate. The
ethical framework we present in this paper was developed
in the European Union-funded FP7 ACCOMPANY pro-
ject, which has adapted the Care-O-bot as a home com-
panion for older people. ACCOMPANY scenarios
primarily address the isolation and reduced physical func-
tioning of some older people, especially those living alone
in a non-institutional setting. Our ethical framework gives
autonomy priority in a list of purposes served by assistive
technology in general, and carebots in particular, for iso-
lated and frail older people.
The paper consists of four sections. In the first, the
capacity of robots to be ‘‘present’’ to their users is intro-
duced. We argue that presence is a necessary condition for
being a companion robot but a far from sufficient condition
of being a carer or even of being a care-robot in a substantial
sense of ‘care’. In the second section we describe relatively
low tech assistive technology and its benefits, and contrast
these with what a robot can offer. The possible ethical
problems of carebot design are then considered, on the basis
of the review of recent carebot literature by Vallor (2011).
This provides some context for the ethical assessment of
robotic assistive technology. In the third section we consider
what might need to be added to presence to produce care
from a companion robot that deals with older people’s
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reduced functioning and isolation. We distinguish between
single-function and multi-function robots and what they can
contribute to the care of older people in combination.
Finally, we introduce an ethical framework that combines
sometimes conflicting values that the design of a carebot
might incorporate. The framework is informed by an ana-
lysis of the different roles that can be served by a companion
robot, roles that are catered for in ACCOMPANY scenarios.
Autonomy on the part of users is the pre-eminent value that
we argue a carebot should promote. It is more important even
than safety and social connectedness.
Robots, ‘presence’ and the requirements of care
Care that depends significantly on technology is already a
reality in much of Western Europe, but the technology typ-
ically used is not robotic. On the contrary, some of it is
decidedly low-tech. Assistive technology for older people in
the UK includes wearable alarms for summoning help;
smoke, CO2 and flood sensors; pillboxes that are designed to
help older people to take all of their medication on time; and
fall sensors. Two-way visual contact through webcams and
television monitors is also available, though less widely, and
relatively inexpensively. This enables family or paid support
workers to ‘look in’ on an older person and their home
without travelling (Bayer et al. 2007; Bowes and McColgan
2006). If older people are comfortable with computers, vir-
tual visiting is cheap and easily accessed—no more difficult
to obtain than a Skype account—and there are virtual visiting
systems simpler than Skype which operate using local
broadband networks.
What, if anything, can robots add to this array of non-
robotic assistive technology? There are a number of pos-
sible answers to this question, corresponding to differences
between robots. A number of robots simulate the appear-
ance, feel and behaviour of small domestic pets. These can
have some of the beneficial effects of real pets—providing
a facsimile of companionship and an outlet for a sort of
affection for otherwise lonely and isolated people.1 Such
robots are relatively cheap, and their therapeutic benefits
are in principle available not only to older people, but to
younger people who are cognitively impaired, including
children with autism. Considerably more expensive are
multi-functioning humanoid robots that are able to move
about in an apartment or bungalow, carrying out tasks for
an older person, their carers, or both. An example of such
technology which we will concentrate on in what follows is
the Care-O-bot.2 Care-O-bot platforms can be
programmed to speak to the older person, to fetch and lift
things, and to act as an audio-visual portal to the world
outside the older person’s home. In principle, the Care-O-
bot could help to steady an older person when moving
from a sitting to a standing position or as they walk. It can
also be programmed to learn and to remember an older
person’s daily routine, remind them of things, and summon
help in the event of a fall or some other recognized mishap.
In what follows, we use the term ‘humanoid robot’ not for
a robot that simulates human behaviour, including facial
expressions and posture, but for an upright multi-functioning
social robot that typically has facial features, usually quite
schematic or cartoon-like features, some sort of communi-
cative interface, and perhaps arms. Care-O-bot is such a
robot. Without simulating the adult human body, it has the
rough counterpart of such a body, much as a simple cartoon
of a human being can be taken to resemble a human being.
By ‘non-humanoid’ robot we will usually mean some single-
function, often very compact, machine with no counterpart
of a human body, though sometimes with the counterpart of
an animal body.
Both humanoid and non-humanoid robots add to the
potential benefits for older people of non-robotic assistive
technology. A common benefit of some examples of both
kinds of robots is that they have what we shall call ‘pre-
sence’. This includes, but comes to more than, being there
with the older person. Being there—in the minimal sense of
being co-located with a person—is open to a mop, a broom,
or a newspaper. What is meant by ‘presence’ is the kind of
co-location of a thing with a person that brings it about that
the person no longer feels alone. A child co-located with a
bed will probably feel alone, even if the bed is comfortable
and familiar. But a child co-located with a bed and a familiar
cuddly toy will probably feel that they are in the presence of
something or someone, even though the cuddly toy is inan-
imate and inert and has degenerated after years of handling to
a lump of cloth. This illustrates what is meant by ‘presence’.3
In ACCOMPANY, the Care-O-bot has sophisticated pre-
sence, since it not only acts against the feeling of being alone,
but does so by moving around with the older person,
appearing to take interest in activities in which the older
person is engaged, prompting him or her undertake benefi-
cial behaviours, communicating through a touch screen and
reacting to the older person’s commands. This is what we
mean by ‘sophisticated presence’.
Evidence gathered in ACCOMPANY4 suggests that for
older people exposed to it for short lengths of time in an
1 See for instance Paro the seal http://www.parorobots.com/index.
asp.
2 See http://www.care-o-bot.de/english/.
3 ‘Presence’ in this sense is an effect of the robot on its companion.
This is not to be confused with telepresence, where someone is not co-
located with a robot, but is able to get audio-visual experience of the
place where a remote robot is located, or where it is moving.
4 The authors are members of the ACCOMPANY project team. The
research leading to these results has received funding from the
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experimental smart home, Care-O-bot has presence.
Some can even imagine forming what they term ‘attach-
ment’ to a Care-O-bot. Users may also give the robot
gendered names. This shows that social robots are likely to
be more than present to users, since attachment goes
beyond not feeling alone. ACCOMPANY is adapting the
Care-O-bot for some scenarios illustrating what robot
companionship for older people might mean. The scenarios
call for the robot to be able to monitor the position of the
user, sometimes remotely, and for fetching and carrying for
the user in which the robot does not simply respond to user
commands but prompts the user to do things with its aid,
including moving between rooms. The ACCOMPANY
robot is also in some sense a stand-in for another human
presence, as it expresses a small range of emotions which
aspire to make the relationship with the older person
mutual and, in a straitened sense, ‘empathic’. Another
aspect of the robot design is that it aims to enable Care-O-
bot to distinguish its user from other human beings in a
home setting (e.g. visitors or members of the extended
family), and to respond differentially to the user.
The ACCOMPANY design captures some aspects of
companionship. Since other kinds of presence can be pro-
vided more cheaply by non humanoid social robots and by
real human beings making use of non-robotic assistive
technology—especially Skype technology—we are not
convinced that the Care-O-bot—especially at its current
cost and with its relatively meagre capabilities—is the right
form for machine-assisted care to take.
On the contrary, we think it more likely that machine-
assisted care will be some combination of non-robotic as-
sistive technology and non-humanoid, social or single-
function robots. It is true that humanoid, multi-function
robots are more likely than non-humanoid, single-function
robots and non-robotic technology to combine a relatively
wide range of capabilities within a single, unified presence,
but how important it is to combine capabilities, and how
important the lifting, fetching and walk-assisting capabili-
ties of the Care-O-bot are, is unclear to us. It is possible
that a humanoid robot has a role in assisting older people
who are isolated to keep up their skills of social interaction.
This is a possibility that the ‘empathic’ aspect of the
ACCOMPANY design has tried to realize. But it is also
possible that less is more in robotic technology in particular
and assistive technology in general, and that a combination
of different machines, some having presence and some not,
may deliver more benefits.
Some comments on the ethical value of assistive
technology for older people who are not cognitively
impaired
Non-robotic technology already enables people with physi-
cal disabilities, including those who are older, to live rela-
tively independently in homes of their own. Ramps,
handholds, special kinds of lighting, highly legible tele-
phone handsets and walkers are among the kinds of equip-
ment that might be added to a conventionally designed house
to adapt it to a resident with physical disabilities (Doughty
et al. 2007; Alaszewski and Cappello 2006). Then there is a
variety of sensors and alarms, some designed to alert the
householder to a risk, and some designed to alert a source of
outside help. This equipment is characteristic of telecare.
Telecare can also make use of combinations of television and
webcam equipment, enabling ‘virtual’ visiting by health care
or social workers (Dixon and Stahl 2009; Percival and
Hanson 2006). Telehealth is another use of assistive tech-
nology. Here the purpose of the technology is typically to
monitor a medical condition that has required or could
require hospitalization, and to facilitate timely interventions
if the condition worsens (Rogers et al. 2011). Unlike tele-
health, telecare does not necessarily monitor vital signs or
other symptoms. It monitors, often unobtrusively, how an
older person is using their house, and takes unusual patterns
of movement or rest, or unusual events (like water overflows
in bathrooms), as cues for intervention by people outside the
home.
In considering the ethical value of assistive technology,
it is useful to ask whom it assists, or assists primarily. Some
technology primarily assists a householder or a patient;
other technology may be designed primarily to reduce the
burden on carers of patients or householders. To begin
with patients or householders, healthy older people are one
target group for non-robotic assistive technology. Frail
older people are another; older people with dementia are a
third. Younger people with some cognitive impairment are
a further class.5 Other technology assists family members
or a care organization located at one remove from the
householder or patient.
Cognitively able but physically not very capable older
people are probably the central client group catered for by
policy documents on telecare (Department of Health 2005,
2008, 2010).6 These are people who meet the legal stan-
dards for making decisions about their welfare, entering
Footnote 4 continued
[European Union’s] Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-
2013) under grant agreement no. [287624]. Some ACCOMPANY
deliverables (including those referred to below, are public and can be
found at the project website: http://www.accompanyproject.eu/.
5 But as ACCOMPANY is aimed at older people, this group of
potential users will not be discussed here.
6 These documents tend not to distinguish between those over 65 and
the much older. The ‘oldest old’ may pose special problems for
assistive technology [see Misselhorn et al. (2013)]. The ACCOM-
PANY robot is not designed specifically for those in the Fourth Age,
and may not be well-suited to the oldest old.
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into contracts, making wills and so on, but who may be
much less mobile and agile than people in their 40 and
50 s. This class is representative of the growing proportion
of ageing adults in the general population of the UK and
other Western countries whose health and life expectancy
are much better than those of previous generations, and
whose eventual demands on public care provision are as
yet unknown.7 Telecare is, among other things, a way of
extending the time that cognitively unimpaired and mobile
older people are able to live in their own homes rather than
hospital or residential care homes, publicly funded ones in
particular. Those with physical and intellectual disabilities
are in principle distinct from older users of telecare:
although it is true that many older people suffer from
dementia and physical disability, it is not clear that the
ethical issues raised for telecare by the whole class of those
with physically disability can readily be inferred from the
ethical issues raised for telecare by older people with dis-
abilities. What we have are overlapping groups with
overlapping issues.
The decision of cognitively unimpaired but less able
people to take assistive technology into their homes8 is a
decision to live with a certain loss of privacy9 in return for
effective emergency or care response or more effective
management of long-term medical conditions. Sensors to
detect falls, bed-wetting and chair-wetting, and the length
of time people spend in bed or in the bathroom, are widely
used. Sensors can also detect whether external doors have
been opened at odd hours, or left open for an abnormally
long time (Perry et al. 2009). Medical equipment that
detects signs of deteriorating asthma, chronic heart and
lung ailments or diabetes is now available (Garcia-Lizana
and Sarria-Santamera 2007; Pare´ et al. 2007). Some of this
equipment sends information automatically to central
response centres or medical practices (Dang et al. 2009).
Telehealth equipment can also send information about
amounts of medication taken at different times.10
User-centred assistive technology can reduce the burden
of carers, but it need not do so, especially if the user has
habits that carry some risks, or has a lifestyle that is not
risky but is disapproved of by family or carers. For
example, if user-centred telecare facilitates private com-
munication or visits to an older person from someone
whom he or she, but not their family approves of, say a
younger member of the opposite sex, whom the family
suspects is only interested in obtaining the older person’s
money, then it might add to the worries and burdens of the
carers (Draper and Sorell 2012).
This possibility notwithstanding, there are good moral
reasons why user-centredness rather than carer-centredness
is the appropriate default position for older people’s care in
general, including the design of assistive technology for
them, and robot-assisted care in particular. One reason is
that the older person is an adult, with a life of his or her
own to lead. This point is crucial to the approach taken in
this paper, which is to extend the norms of fully able-
bodied, socialized adult life to older people who are frail
and isolated, when there is a technology available to them
that compensates for isolation and physical decline.
Why apply norms for able-bodied adults in their prime
to older people? The older person is no less an adult than
someone much younger whose choice of, for example,
sexual or other companions would normally not be anyone
else’s business, not even the business of the younger per-
son’s friends or family. Likewise, a middle-aged person
can form relationships that his or her family disapproves of,
but their disapproval is not normally taken to be decisive
for what the middle-aged person should do, even if the
middle-aged person is dependent on e.g. his daughter for
meals, laundry and general organization.
If the older adult is to be treated differently from the
younger adult, and if that difference in treatment is to be
justified morally, then there has to be something about
being older that makes one less able to lead one’s own life.
7 Though predictions for care needs based on current demand,
extrapolated to the expected increase in the proportion of older people
in the population, suggest something of an explosion in the need for
care; e.g. OECD (2011).
8 It is important to remember that all assistive technology is
introduced into a person’s home. The significance of its being a
home and the significance of ‘home’ to individuals means, as we
explain below, that it should only be introduced with appropriate
consent from the autonomous person whose home it is.
9 Users of telecare and telehealth equipment are sometimes conscious
of being under surveillance and dislike the Orwellian ‘Big Brother’
aspects of telecare and telehealth (Percival and Hanson 2006;
Robinson et al. 2007). Do these aspects count against telecare
morally? Whether they do depends on whether the purpose of the
monitoring is sufficiently similar to that of state security surveillance,
and whether sensors are necessary for that purpose. State security
surveillance seeks to collect evidence of behaviour that is illegal or
damaging to the security of the state. It is not done for the benefit of
the person surveilled, but for the wider public, or for the maintenance
of the state. Telecare and telehealth, on the other hand, are operated
for the benefit of the person monitored, and, in Western countries, are
only introduced into people’s homes with their consent. They are an
early warning system for a health problem or a health emergency. Far
from leading to arrest, prosecution and imprisonment, they trigger
rescue or medical intervention for a particular person identified in
advance as being medically needy. Beyond that, telecare is at least
often claimed by its promoters to maintain the independence of its
users (Woolham 2006). This purpose is often given greater weight, at
least officially, than relieving the burden on a carer (Brownsell et al.
2003; Poole 2006; Greenhalgh et al. 2012). For a full discussion of the
ethics of surveillance in telecare, see Sorell and Draper (2012).
10 The US Food and Drugs Administration recently approved the use of
an ingestible sensor in pills to monitor the medication intake of patients:
http://proteusdigitalhealth.com/proteus-digital-health-announces-fda-
clearance-of-ingestible-sensor/.
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Although there may be some facts of older-age that are
relevant here—declining mobility and worsening memory,
for instance—these do not mean that one is not able to
make decisions about how one’s life should be run. After
all, many much younger people who are forgetful, or who
are not very agile or mobile through some accident, are not
taken to be incapable of decision-making, and the quality
of their decision-making may be no better than that of an
older person who has age-related forgetfulness. Unless an
older person is cognitively impaired—and cognitive
impairment need not attend older-age even when older
people are no longer mobile—there is every reason to treat
older people as all other unimpaired adults are treated,
namely as able to make their own decisions, including
exercising the right to make their own mistakes and take
the consequences.
From a moral point of view, the decision-making of the
user may even have to be allowed to extend to the question
of what counts as an emergency. Under some telecare and
telehealth regimes, it can be the judgment of telecare
monitors that triggers an emergency intervention. Why
should not people who are medically needy but perfectly
competent trigger a rescue or medical intervention them-
selves?11 This would be more consistent with the auton-
omy-promoting aims of assistive technology than the
intervention triggered by the outsider. Some assistive
technology does work in this autonomy-promoting way.
Among the longest-established assistive technology devi-
ces are alarms that older people can set off if they fall or
are in distress (Fisk 2003). These alarm devices can be
worn, and so need never be out of reach. Alarms belong to
a wider class of assistive technology devices in the control
of the person receiving the care. These can include sensors
for over-running baths and smoke that alert the user rather
than a remote telecare hub, and that can prompt the user to
set off their alarm if they feel they cannot cope. In the
event that users feel that they can cope, a mishap such as a
fall need not be regarded as an emergency, still less an
emergency so overwhelming that outsiders need to come to
the rescue.
In the same way, sensors monitoring medication use
might alert healthy older users, rather than a remote carer,
that tablets had not been taken. The user would then be free
to take the tablets if he or she chose. Instead of outsider-
controlled assistive technology, we have here the technol-
ogy of the ‘smart home’, that is, technology that keeps
track of hazards for the householder rather than an outsider,
that does not keep track of the householder him or herself,
and that does not make decisions for the householder or
involve others in decision-making independently of the
householder. It is smart home technology along these lines
that should probably be preferred to outsider-controlled
technology in the care of the competent but capable
elderly, as it better respects their autonomy.12
User control can sometimes be the other side of the coin of
user isolation. The older householder who autonomously
manages her life, whether or not she has a chronic illness, may
often do so because she is alone. Assistive technology
sometimes reduces regular human contact, in particular visits
of, or to, care assistants and other carers (Clark et al. 2007;
Lim et al. 2007). Whether telecare must increase isolation in
order to serve its standard twin purposes of promoting inde-
pendence and reducing the public expenditure involved in
hospitalization or maintaining state-run care homes is not
always easy to determine (Sorell and Draper 2012; Murray
et al. 2011; Pols 2010).13 Relatively inexpensive virtual vis-
iting can make available important facets of human contact.
Contact can even be enhanced, since technology reduces the
size of the obstacle posed by distance and the familiar problem
of having to be in two places at once. When one visits virtu-
ally, with good, real time audio/visual access to the older
person’s home, the virtual visitor is in two places at once, for
most purposes. Similarly for the older people visited. The
equipment enables older people who are virtually visited to
see not only the people they are conversing with but their
home environments in real-time. Earphones can even make
virtual visitors much more audible for the hard of hearing than
being co-present with the same people in a room with a great
deal of background noise.14 It is true that equipment for virtual
visiting also creates opportunities for intrusion—but this may
be no greater than home visiting. When it is user-controlled
and combined with the usual array of sensors and monitors,
however, it may at least in principle provide health and social
11 We assume here responsible use of emergency facilities (see
Draper and Sorell (2002)) and also note that there are anecdotal
reports on older users using alarm devices because they feel lonely
and regard this as one means, perhaps their only means, of getting
human contact.
12 Locating control with the user fits in with one finding from surveys
of users of telecare, namely that they dislike the way it takes away
their control over revealing increasing frailty or disability (Sorell and
Draper 2012). This desire to retain control was also reflected in the
data collected by MADoPA and reported in ACCOMPANY deliv-
erable D1.2 Report on user and system requirements and first outline
of system functionality.
13 It is also possible the developments in technology and human
interactions with technology will change the meaning of isolation.
People who, even when young, maintain social relations online may
feel far less lonely when they lose physical mobility than older people
for whom computer contact by itself does not relieve feelings of
isolation. In the same way, playing with a robot dog might well come
to feel just as satisfying for future older people as playing with a real
dog might today. For more on the way that the evolving use of
technology can reconstitute such concepts as isolation, see Coeckel-
bergh (2012).
14 There is considerable literature on tele-consultation and within
this, evidence that focussing on a single item can improve concen-
tration, see for instance Sa¨venstedt et al (2005)
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gains for older people, cost-savings for health and social
services, and a more manageable care burden for friends and
family living separately from users.
Carebots versus low tech assistive technology
What do robots actually add, and what can they potentially
add, to non-robotic assistive technology? What in particular
can the Care-O-bot in ACCOMPANY add? ACCOMPANY
is user- centred rather than carer-centred. Its robot has not
been conceptualized as a piece of technology that helps the
older person’s family or care providers by being their repre-
sentative in the older person’s house, doing for the older
person what the family or carers would otherwise do, and
allowing carers more time of their own. Instead, it has been
designed to serve as a multi-functioning, humanoid presence
in an older person’s home, capable of acting as companion,
helper and enabler, and sensitive to the wishes of the user
before the wishes of others.
Multi-functioning, humanoid robot companions are at
one end of a spectrum of robotic products with care or
enablement functions.15 At the companion end of the
robotic spectrum can also be found non-humanoid com-
panion devices such as dolls and simulations of small
animals. There are also hybrids of humanoid robots and
companion animals. Riken have developed the Riba robot
(Robot for Interactive Body Assistance): an adult-sized
robot designed to look like a streamlined white teddy bear
that can pick up and carry humans from a bed to a
wheelchair.16 At the other end of the spectrum are devices
that are more like clothing, and, when worn, markedly
increase the strength of users.17 In between are robotic
devices18 whose functions, including monitoring and
functioning as an interactive portal, are carried out sepa-
rately by different kinds of telecare devices. Other robots
are single function machines that enable the user to be
more independent, such as My Spoon19 and vacuuming and
floor-washing robots.20
The literature on the ethics of robotics sometimes
identifies tensions between the design and use of care-
bots—including some that are similar to the Care-O-bot
used in ACCOMPANY—and the morally desirable treat-
ment of older persons as autonomous adults. Vallor (2011)
has identified the following concerns from her review of
the literature:
1. The objectification of the elderly as ‘‘problems’’ to be
solved by technological means (Sparrow and Sparrow
2006; Sharkey and Sharkey 2010)
2. The potential for carebots to either enhance or restrict
the capabilities, freedom, autonomy, and/or dignity of
cared-fors (Borenstein and Pearson 2010; Sharkey and
Sharkey 2010; Decker 2008)
3. The potential of carebots to enhance or reduce
engagement of cared-fors with their surroundings
(Borenstein and Pearson 2010; Sharkey and Sharkey
2010)
4. The potential of carebots to enhance or intrude upon
the privacy of cared-fors (Sharkey and Sharkey 2010)
5. The quality of physical and psychological care robots
can realistically be expected to supply (Coeckelbergh
2010; Sparrow and Sparrow 2006)
6. The potential of carebots to either reduce or enhance
cared-fors’ levels of human contact with families and
other human caregivers (Sparrow and Sparrow 2006)
7. The potential of carebot relations to be inherently
deceptive or infantilizing (Sparrow and Sparrow 2006;
Sharkey and Sharkey 2010; Turkle 2006)
The second of these seven concerns is the one that
ACCOMPANY principally tries to address. Far from
restricting the capabilities, freedom, autonomy and dignity
of users, ACCOMPANY aims at maximizing those things.
We shall first explain how ACCOMPANY sets out to
enhance or at least preserve the autonomy and capabilities
of users.21 We shall consider whether ACCOMPANY
addresses other issues on Vallor’s list. Finally, we shall
return to the question of whether the ACCOMPANY Care-
15 ACCOMPANY deliverable D1.1 Status of elderly care in Europe
and the potential for service robots. Available http://accompanypro
ject.eu/ [Accessed 19/1/2014].
16 http://rtc.nagoya.riken.jp/RIBA/index-e.html.
17 For a video of the Cyberdene HAL ‘‘power suit’’, see http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=fy7ipDAyXtI&feature=related.
18 These are the so-called ‘‘Remote Presence’’ robots manufactured
by intouch. See http://www.intouchhealth.com/products-and-services/
products/rp-7i-robot/
19 My Spoon helps users to feed themselves. http://www.secom.co.jp/
english/myspoon/usage.html
20 Such as those produced by iRobot http://www.irobot.com/uk/
home.aspx.
21 ‘Capabilities’ is used here in its ordinary sense, as a synonym for
‘abilities’, and not in the senses assigned to the term by Sen, and Sen
and Nussbaum, in their work on the capability approach to
development. Although we realize that this approach (primarily in
the Nussbaum version) has been extended to robots (Coeckelbergh
2012), we think that it is ill-suited to different stages of the life
course, in particular older age. In Nussbaum’s hands, the capability
approach is essentially a repackaging of Aristotle, which is in its turn
ill-suited to questions about the flourishing of human beings with
disabilities and the possibility of flourishing at stages of life in which
there is a natural decline in capacities. A proper discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of the paper, but an important point would
be that flourishing for a species (central to Aristotle) question-
beggingly privileges certain points in the life course of members of
that species.
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O-bot and carebots generally do better than lower tech
solutions in assistive technology.
The ACCOMPANY Care-O-bot is designed to be
stationed in the home of the older person. It is not brought
into the older person’s home only from time to time. Nor
does it divide its time between a number of different rooms
in an institutional care-home corridor. Instead, it is a semi-
permanent fixture in a home occupied by one person. Its
role in that person’s home is partly that of helper, partly
that of enabler, partly that of co-learner, and partly that of
companion.
The Care-O-bot is able to lift and carry household
objects, and also to fetch objects at the command of the
user. It is also able to remind the user of different sched-
uled or routine events, such as a visit, or the need to place a
shopping order, or to go to a doctor’s appointment. The
robot is able to keep track of the user’s position in the
house and to register falls or other signs of harmful inci-
dents. It is able to distinguish the user from other people
who might enter the home, and it is able to treat the orders
or requests of the user as having more authority than those
of visitors. The co-learner role is a matter of the process by
which the robot and the user accommodate themselves to
one another. The user’s routine will shape many interac-
tions between the user and the robot. For example, if the
user often wakes at 9 am rather than 7 a.m., the robot can
learn that and be ready to fetch a morning drink at the right
time. If a routine-disrupting appointment is made, the robot
can register that and prompt the user to get dressed for a
visit or to go out at a certain time. The robot can also take
part in recreational pastimes—providing music to go with a
song, or perhaps staying in the same room as the user as he
or she watches television, and making gestures which
suggest it is giving attention to the user or what the user is
doing. Through its tray/tablet it can offer a video and
internet portal, making possible virtual visiting.
Although the Care-O-bot is in most respects at the
service of its older user, the Siena roboticists in the
ACCOMPANY consortium are seeking to endow it with
capabilities that contribute to maintaining the social skills
of the user—by making the obedience of the robot less than
absolute. Sometimes the ‘displeasure’ of the robot is
communicated to the user through a tablet interface
showing a diagrammatic ‘‘empathic mask’’ (Stienstra and
Marti 2012). This empathic mask can signal the robot’s
‘worry’ about the older person, its ‘pleasure’ at his or her
co-operation or ‘displeasure’ when he or she is over-
insistent or impatient. The effect of this is to remind a user
who may be interacting socially mainly with the robot that
it, as the local representative of the social world, needs to
be treated with a kind of consideration, and that the social
skills of responding to gentleness with gentleness need to
be kept up. The Siena work also makes possible a high
degree of sensitivity to tactile interactions between the user
and the robot. The tablet interface between the user and the
robot can register the pressure exerted on it when the user
squeezes it, and can process a hard squeeze as an indication
of urgency in a command. Again, the robot can simulate
‘emotional synchronization’ with the user, apparently tak-
ing up a position near the user and directing its attention
where the user does when, for example, the user watches
television.
In what ways does the Care-O-bot promote the
autonomy and independence of the older person? To begin
with, the Care-O-bot takes the user’s routine and the
preferences embodied in this routine as its frame of refer-
ence. This means that the user’s choices are foremost and,
other things being equal, are implemented unquestioningly.
So the agent’s autonomy is not at all impaired. It would be
impaired if the choices of others started to supplant the
user’s choices. But in ACCOMPANY scenarios this does
not happen. Far from introducing new choices, still less
choices at variance with those of the user, the Care-O-bot
takes its cue from the user’s choices. The robot is also able
to co-ordinate those choices through scheduling and
prompting abilities. In both of these ways the ACCOM-
PANY Care-O-bot promotes the autonomy of the user.
User safety constrains the autonomy-respecting features
of carebots. Sharkey and Sharkey (2010) ask what would
happen if a user instructed a lifting and carrying robot to
release him or her over the side of a high balcony in an
apartment building. Even if that suicidal request were
competent and highly autonomous—not the result of
treatable depression, for example—there would be a good
moral reason for programming a carebot not to comply
with it, namely that the robot would not normally be able to
tell whether such a request was competent and autono-
mous. Likewise, one would expect a carebot with moni-
toring abilities to abort an activity requested by the user if,
while undertaking that activity, it registered that the user
had fallen or that his or her vital signs had suddenly
changed. But notice that we would expect the same
behaviour of an autonomy-respecting human helper as
well, since loss of life and sudden medical emergencies
disrupt or undermine the exercise of autonomy.
Autonomy—choosing for oneself and acting in accor-
dance with one’s choices—is different from independence.
Independence is being able to act on one’s choices without
depending on the consent or co-operation or resources of
others. If someone chooses to live the life of a sailor, for
example, but can only succeed in doing so if a shipping
company offers employment, then there is a clear sense in
which the agent is not an independent sailor, however
much his choice of sailing as an occupation is autonomous.
Independence might only be achieved if he owned a suit-
able boat or ship for as long as he wanted to live the life of
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a sailor. In the case of older people, autonomy can some-
times co-exist more or less constantly with dependence
rather than independence. In other words, the choices of
older people can often need to be realized through the
efforts of others.
Although an older person can still make his or her own
choices, he or she may not be physically strong enough, or
mobile enough, or rich enough to see them through.
Carebots can act against some sources of dependence, like
physical weakness, but not others, such as lack of wealth.22
Sometimes in discussions about older people, indepen-
dence is not understood with respect to one’s command of
the means for realizing choices in general, but rather in
terms of one’s ability to keep oneself clean, fed, sheltered,
unharmed and legally occupied without the constant
assistance of other people. Carebots readily promote
independence in this limited sense, but not independence in
all of the respects in which it affects autonomous choices.
Carebots in general and the ACCOMPANY Care-O-
bot in particular also address issues other than autonomy
and independence on Vallor’s list. The sixth concern (‘The
potential of carebots to either reduce or enhance cared-fors’
levels of human contact with families and other human
caregivers’) highlights the potential isolation of older
people whose main interactions are with machines. We
have already seen that, in telecare, technology can be a
gateway rather than a barrier to human contact. This is
because it can act as a portal for two-way communication
and more. What about carebots? Although they also afford
the possibility of virtual visits, there is a clear difference
between having a two-way television in one’s house and
having a Care-O-bot. The Care-O-bot is a presence in its
own right in a way a television is not. To put it in another
way, the television is not a subject of interaction but at
most a medium of interaction. On the other hand, a Care-O-
bot is a subject of interaction—a possible ‘conversation’
partner and a possible participant in synchronised activity.
Admittedly, the Care-O-bot’s current communicative
abilities are so limited as to be conversational only in an
inverted commas sense; admittedly, the extent to which its
presence fills a gap left by human contact is very restricted.
Still, there is a sense in which the Care-O-bot in
ACCOMPANY and other carebots fulfil the conditions for
what, at the beginning of this paper, we called ‘presence’:
when carebots are co-present with people, those people can
feel that they are not alone. This does not seem to be a
power of television sets. It is of course possible for an
image on a two-way television to produce the feeling of not
being alone. But a Care-O-bot resident in one’s home can
create this feeling even when it is not functioning as a
virtual visiting portal. This is an important difference
between non-robotic assistive technology and robots.
Can only a carebot—typically an adult-sized humanoid
fetcher-carrier-lifter with restricted communicative capac-
ities—have presence, or is presence open to much simpler
robots? Much simpler non-humanoid social robots
undoubtedly can have presence. The Paro 23—a small fur-
covered robot that looks like a seal—is specifically
designed for therapeutic uses with older people. It is pro-
grammed to exhibit a range of responses to being petted,
including moving its tail and opening and closing its eyes.
It also ‘learns’ actions that the user likes or dislikes (it
responds to being hit as well as petted), can respond to
voice direction and tone, and detects the difference
between day and night and is more or less active accord-
ingly. Although the evidence regarding Paro’s actual
effectiveness as a companion is open to more than one
interpretation, some studies have concluded that animal
robots have some of the therapeutic powers of real
domestic animals,24 but without the care-burdens of own-
ing a real domestic animal. Again, it is plausible that Paro
serves the purposes of the oldest old better than the
somewhat younger intended users of the ACCOMPANY
carebot.
If the isolation and loneliness of older people were the
only or the main problem that robots were being introduced
to solve, then, a multi-functioning humanoid robot might
not be needed. And there would be lower-tech solutions to
the loneliness problem if there were regular two-way vir-
tual visiting between actual human beings. Or a combina-
tion of simpler robots and two-way television may be the
best of both the high-tech and low-tech worlds for com-
bating loneliness, providing both permanent and low-
maintenance presence but also regular human contact. (No
tech visits would of course be possible and might be best of
all therapeutically, but could be expensive in time and
money).
An ethical framework for judging carebots for older
people
When what is in question is the promotion of autonomy,
independence and some form of human contact, what, if
anything, recommends a carebot solution to providing care
for older people over a telecare, or single-function and
simple companion robot solution, or a combination of
22 ACCOMPANY deliverable D1.1 ‘Status of elderly care in Europe
and the potential for service robots’ noted that there are inconsisten-
cies across the EU in how assistive technologies for older people may
be funded, and not all EU citizens in need of help can be sure of
receiving state funded assistance. Available http://accompanyproject.
eu/ [Accessed 19/1/2014].
23 http://www.parorobots.com/index.asp
24 See Misselhorn et al. op. cit.
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telecare and single-function and simple companion robots?
If the money cost of a multi-function, humanoid carebot is
taken into account, the answer may be ‘‘Nothing’’. On the
other hand, if financial costs are disregarded, then the
answer on the basis of the previous discussion may be that
the carebot solution delivers physical help, and the ability
in principle to integrate telecare and sophisticated pre-
sence. By ‘sophisticated presence’, as explained in the
section ‘‘Robots, ‘presence’ and the requirements of care’’,
we mean that the carebot interacts and can even initiate
interaction with the user. Moreover, the quality of inter-
action is far more sensitive and far more challenging than
the passive twitches and facial expressions of Paro. By
taking over some of the functions of telecare, the
ACCOMPANY Care-O-bot can keep track of the location
and condition of the user. It does so, however, from close at
hand, potentially enabling quicker intervention or emer-
gency response than conventional telecare devices relaying
data to a remote information hub (assuming that the carebot
is not itself programmed to summon help from a similar
hub). In other words, cost considerations apart, a carebot
may give us in a single package a highly desirable
embodiment of assistive technology alongside practical
help with lifting, carrying and fetching.
The previous discussion, however, may be inadequate
for a full answer to the question of the comparative value of
low-tech and robotic assistive technology. So far we have
been guided by a list of ethical issues raised by philoso-
phers and technologists who have reflected on the capa-
bilities of robots designed or used to provide care for older
people and meet the needs of older people as they present
themselves in ordinary experience. But perhaps the com-
mon sense of philosophers and technologists is a bad guide
to the needs or preferences of the elderly. The preferences
and needs of the current population of older people are not
representative of future older people, and are subject to
cultural variation even in the present. Moreover the list of
ethical issues depends on the assumption that the experi-
ence of older people, especially in the West, is more or less
uniform (Parks 2010).25
Any development of an ethical framework for evalua-
tion of carebots must be informed by the attitudes of older
people themselves, with allowances being made for big
variations in technophobia between people who currently
are 60 years old and people who are currently over
80 years of age. The importance to an ethical framework of
taking into account user-attitudes is connected with the
value of autonomy. If carebot use is to take its cue from the
wishes of individual older users of carebots, and if surveys
of older people reveal a range of design-relevant prefer-
ences which do not correlate with the design features of the
carebot that engineers intend to realize (Van der Plas et al.
2010), this may suggest that engineers think they know
better than their potential older users what carebots should
be like, or that they do not know and have not bothered to
find out what older users of carebots might be looking for.
Either way, the potential of the engineer-designed carebot
to promote the autonomy of older users might be
compromised.
ACCOMPANY has conducted research among panels of
older people in the UK, the Netherlands and France. The
project is investigating what users might want from a ca-
rebot, and has found that mobility, self-care and isolation
are major preoccupations, while co-learning seems not to
be.26 Does this finding mean that ACCOMPANY should
drop co-learning from its designs for robots? Not neces-
sarily. Co-learning may have other effects that older people
could benefit from and that they want, even if they want
other effects more. There could be a therapeutic rationale
for some design features that older people don’t want or
don’t want much, so long as on balance groups of older
people have been consulted and listened to in relation to
design, and so long as the ACCOMPANY Care-O-bot
accommodates itself to individual users rather than coming
up with an agenda of its own. To go back to Siena’s
methods of keeping up older people’s social skills by
adjusting its behaviour to the user’s tone of voice, this
might have what is broadly speaking a therapeutic benefit
even if the older person doesn’t like it much.
Vallor’s list of ethical concerns indeed anticipates the
way that the Siena design might be justified. It in effect
asks philosophers and technologists to think about:
3.The potential of carebots to enhance or reduce
engagement of cared-fors with their surroundings
and
5. The quality of physical and psychological care that
robots can realistically be expected to supply.
The Siena innovations try to improve social skills and,
indirectly, the psychological well-being of older users.
They also introduce companionship into such routine ways
25 Jennifer Parks, for instance, notes that cultural difference may be
significant in terms of both how people respond to robots versus
humans and different robotic persona. Discussion about the paucity of
data about, and understanding of, cultural differences in perceptions
and approaches to ageing in general can be found in University of
Birmingham Policy Commission 2014 ‘Health Ageing in the 21st
Century: the best is yet to come.’ Available http://www.birmingham.
ac.uk/research/impact/policy-commissions/healthy-ageing/index.aspx
[Accessed 6/3/2014].
26 See ACCOMPANY deliverables D1.1 Status of elderly care in
Europe and the potential for service robots and D1.2 Report on user
and system requirements and first outline of system functionality.
Both available http://accompanyproject.eu/ [Accessed 19/1/2014].
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of engaging with one’s surroundings such as watching
television and helping with such tasks as moving objects
from one room to another, which promotes living in orderly
and clean surroundings.
Even when the attitudes of users are taken into account,
there may be conflicts within the range of ethical values
that are individually relevant to providing care for older
people. We have already seen that autonomy can conflict
with safety: a carebot that is otherwise dedicated to ful-
filling the wishes of its older user ought not to comply with
a request that is suicidal. Similarly, although older auton-
omous people have a right to privacy at least as extensive
as that of younger people, there may be occasions when a
carebot should report a fall to a non-resident carer or a
medical assistance hub, even if that is against the wishes of
the older person himself or herself.
Against this background, what sort of ethical framework
should be proposed for the design of carebots. The
framework must identify and define values that should be
promoted or at least respected by carebot design and use in
relation to older people, and it must say which value is, or
which values are, overriding when there is a conflict. The
ACCOMPANY project addresses isolation and declining
physical capacity in older people who continue to live and
want to live in their own homes. If a robotic companion is
to be a solution, its design must promote the following:
• autonomy—being able to set goals in life and choose
means;
• independence—being able to implement one’s goals
without the permission, assistance or material resources
of others;
• enablement—having or having access to means of
realizing goals and choices;
• safety—being able readily to avoid pain or harm;
• privacy—being able to pursue and realize one’s goals
and implement one’s choices unobserved;
• social connectedness—having regular contact with
friends and loved ones, and safe access to strangers
one can choose to meet.
All of these values lie in the background of most able-
bodied, independent adult life, and our approach is to
extend these values to later life unless there are reasons not
to do so. Isolation and physical decline might be thought to
be such reasons—unless a technology can compensate for
them. The ACCOMPANY scenarios animate these reasons.
And a particular design of robot companion compensates
for them.
It is, however, inevitable that circumstances will arise
where these values are in tension. When this happens one
value is likely to be given priority over another. The pre-
ceding discussion has suggested that autonomy is a crucial
value but that it can be outweighed when respecting it
would threaten a user’s life or physical well-being. It might
be thought to follow, then, that of the six values, safety is
supreme, trumping even autonomy.
This seems to be a mistake. Not every threat to safety,
even when realized, produces major injury. When the worst
that the exercise of autonomy produces is minor harm, or
not-so-minor but tolerable and survivable harm, autonomy
might win out over safety. Admittedly, the meaning of
‘major harm’ and ‘minor harm’ varies over a life-course.
Falls that are tolerable at 45 years of age and classifiable as
minor then would not be classifiable as minor at 90, but the
threshold has to be quite high if the older person’s auton-
omy is not to be in danger of being entirely undermined by
too conservative a safety regime. In other words, auton-
omy, not safety, should normally be the ruling value in
carebot design. For example, if an older person prefers
being bruised for a week to staying seated or using a
walker, not interfering with a decision to get up and be
active seems to be consistent with the discretion usually
allowed to middle-aged and younger adults with respect to
their health and safety, even when minor harm results.
Allowing the older person the same discretion might mean
designing a carebot so that its prompts to use a walking
frame etc. can be disabled (and perhaps later re-enabled) by
the user.
Because privacy promotes autonomy by allowing users
to discover when unobserved what their limits or vulner-
abilities are, and to factor those into their plans, carebots
should not normally be able to report information about
users to outsiders or let anyone into an older person’s home
without permission. On the other hand, acting on some
kinds of information without reporting to outsiders might
be valuable. Thus, if the carebot has or is connected to
flood sensors in a smart home, there is no reason why it or
the smart home technology cannot trigger a cut in the water
supply and then ask the user what they next want done.
This is in keeping with autonomy. Cutting the water supply
and asking an outsider for subsequent instructions would
undermine user autonomy unless the user was
incapacitated.
Social connectedness is desirable, other things being
equal, because of its potential benefits to physical and
mental health. But the ‘other things being equal’ is
important: it is possible for social connectedness to
empower busybodies, without any benefit to the user.
Instead of social connectedness full stop, chosen social
connectedness with chosen people seems desirable, with
the user deciding, as most adults routinely do, whom to
include and whom not to include in their social circle. A
user who disliked all eligible social connections might
intelligibly choose isolation, but, given the reach of social
networks afforded by the World Wide Web, the number of
eligible social connections is likely to be much larger than
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the number of people the user has good reasons or any
reasons for shunning.
Enablement might also be in tension with autonomy,
since enablement may require individuals to do things for
themselves that they might prefer were done for them, or
that they might prefer not to do at all. Robotic devices are
being developed to help with physical rehabilitation fol-
lowing stroke, accident or amputation. Physiotherapy of
this kind often requires patients to be coaxed, persuaded
and even paternalistically coerced into repeating move-
ments by physiotherapists, who may themselves move or
position the patients in ways that although initially
uncomfortable are necessary for rehabilitation. Returning
someone to a state of greater independence is certainly
compatible with autonomy; the question is whether it is
compatible with autonomy for a carebot to coerce someone
to adhere to regimes that will return them to greater
independence.
The answer to this question may lie in what is agreed with
the older person at the time a rehabilitation device or robot
with enabling capabilities is placed with that person’s con-
sent in their home. In the case of single-purpose device, there
would be no objections to removing a state-funded device
that was lying unused or not being used properly. Carebots
pose a different challenge because they are designed to be
multi-functioning and these other functions would also be
lost if they were removed. Enablement functions are not
quite the same as those providing potential social interaction.
Disliking social interaction and preferring isolation is a
matter of taste. Working against a carebot programmed to
maintain independence is not simply an expression of taste,
but a kind of resistance to independence. Again, the robot
and its developers would not necessarily be working against
the autonomy of older users if the robot refused to do things
that the older person could reasonably do for herself, or
which it might be good for her to do for herself. Indeed, we
can envisage something of a spectrum of mutual accom-
modation. At one extreme might be a user’s refusal to co-
operate with the robot in maintaining his or her mobility. At
the other extreme might be automatic robot compliance with
all user requests, even the request to be thrown off the bal-
cony. Between the extremes might be cases where the robot
enables the user to eat, or drink or smoke excessively. In this
respect choices about the programming of carebots reflect
the ethical issues raised more generally in health promotion
and public health, where what people want is not necessary
what is good for them, and satisfying their desires can be in
tension with health interests.
One of the challenges for the ethical framework in
ACCOMPANY is that the Care-O-bot can play a variety
of roles (companion, helper and enabler), each of which is
subject to different norms in human-to-human service
provision.
To take companionship first, we can assume that the
Care-O-bot is not designed to simulate a family member
but rather to counteract the experience of being always or
mostly alone. The Care-O-bot might therefore play a role
similar to that of a paid companion in late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century England. The companion was paid
to provide constant company, usually for single people, and
shared their employer’s home. This was a role that struck a
balance between friend and servant. The companion could
be a confidante, but, unlike the friend, was an employee
who had very little autonomy and could be called upon to
help with ‘light’ duties—such as sewing or playing sport.
As in the case of the Care-O-bot, the relationship was
one-sided, with the feelings, wishes and whims of the
employer (or older user in the Care-O-bot case) having
most of the weight and those of the companion having little
or none. However, it was considered unseemly to be
unduly rude to or rough with the companion—which cor-
responds with the concerns for ‘respectful’ interaction
being worked on in by the Siena partner in ACCOMPANY.
A helper may be a servant, professional or volunteer,
and these three roles will now be considered in turn. Ser-
vants are paid to do their employer’s bidding, usually
without question. As it operates in ACCOMPANY, Care-
O-bot does not quite take on the traditional role of the
servant, because it is intended to perform tasks that users
are physically unable, rather than unwilling, to do for
themselves. On the other hand, to place Care-O-bot in the
servant role suggests, appropriately enough, that the older
user is controlling the robot rather than the robot control-
ling the older user. It also suggests that the robot should be
discreet, keeping household matters private.
To the extent that it is designed for the frail and those
with physical impairments, the Care-O-bot could be
associated with caring roles filled by nurses, healthcare
assistants and doctors, especially when they are equipped
with interfaces for telehealth interventions. Human carers
are not necessarily obedient servants. On the contrary, they
are likely to have their own ideas about how much help to
give and when, what constitutes help and what form it
should take from occasion to occasion. So there may be a
tension between placing Care-O-bot in the caring role and
placing it in a servant role. In one the older person is the
boss, and in the other the older person sometimes needs to
accommodate the carer. Informal, voluntary care such as
that which might be provided by a friend, incorporates both
the care element and that of companionship. It reinforces
the idea that that whilst the robot is present at the invitation
of the older user, it should not be exploited or ordered
about. It is also more of a relationship between equals, even
though the older user retains the upper hand and the robot
has only limited capacity to withdraw from unsympathetic
behaviour or tone.
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‘Enabler’ may suggest superiority over the enabled: the
human enabler is the one with the knowledge, skills,
abilities and powers to enable. This may also raise ques-
tions about who is deferred to when older person and their
enabler are in conflict. There is a corresponding tension
between enablement and autonomy.
When autonomy conflicts with other values that gov-
ern the possible roles of Care-O-bot, which should
prevail? A way of summarizing much of the foregoing is
by saying that autonomy should. Autonomy can make
sense as the organizing value of the ethical framework
for the design of carebots. Being the organizing value,
autonomy also constrains additions to the value frame-
work: other potential values would be consistent with
autonomy or else have some independent moral
grounding. Should further values be added to those
already introduced?
One source of further values is the interests of carers
connected to the older person. Carers enter the ethical
framework developed so far through its values of safety
and social connectedness, in turn constrained by the value
of keeping the older person autonomous for as long as
possible. This may not be the right way for carers to enter
the framework. It might be thought that by putting older
people and their choices at the centre of things, the
framework denies the dependence of older people on
carers and is in any case too individualistic. For example,
the framework recognises threats to the autonomy of older
people from carers but not the sheer hard work and
sometimes sacrifice of their carers. Perhaps the framework
needs to reduce the value of autonomy in interactions
with the older person the more other people have their
choices reduced by their caring role. Concretely, this
might mean that the ability of the older person to judge
and take risks that could lead to injury and greater
dependence might be restricted the more dependent they
are on others. It might also justify more monitoring and
more reporting to carers.
We are not persuaded that autonomous older persons
necessarily overburden carers, even when they are depen-
dent. But it helps to remind ourselves that we are not
concerned with the general question of the best way of
being fair to carers. We are only concerned with the way
that carers’ interests should be represented in a framework
for the design of carebots. Since carebots of the kind being
developed in the ACCOMPANY project assume only
moderate physical disability and near complete cognitive
functioning in the older people who would be living with
the Care-O-bot, the question of trade-offs between
autonomy and high dependence does not arise. That does
not mean that there are no difficult questions about what
carers have a right to know about in the lives of older
people and what decisions of older people they have a right
to veto, but in general the burden of proof will be on carers
rather than the other way round.27
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